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Success of the Constellation Program's lunar architecture requires successfully
launching two vehicles, Ares I/Orion and Arcs V/Altair, in a very limited time period. The
reliability and maintainability of flight vehicles and ground systems must deliver a high
probability of successfully launching the second vehicle in order to avoid wasting the on-
orbit asset launched by the first vehicle. The Ground Operations Project determined which
ground subsystems had the potential to affect the probability of the second launch and
allocated quantitative availability requirements to these subsystems. The Ground
Operations Project also developed a methodology to estimate subsystem reliability,
availability and maintainability to ensure that ground subsystems complied with allocated
launch availability and maintainability requirements. The verification analysis developed
quantitative estimates of subsystem availability based on design documentation; testing
results, and other information. Where appropriate, actual performance history was used for
legacy subsystems or comparative components that will support Constellation. The results of
the verification analysis will be used to verify compliance with requirements and to highlight
design or performance shortcomings for further decision-making. This case study will
discuss the subsystem requirements allocation process, describe the ground systems
methodology for completing quantitative reliability, availability and maintainability
analysis, and present findings and observation based on analysis leading to the Ground
Systems Preliminary Design Review milestone.
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t	 = Time
R(t)	 = Reliability at time (hours)
Rs	 = System reliability
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I. Introduction
HE Constellation Architecture for human lunar exploration missions requires two launches: the Ares V
Tcarrying the Earth Departure Stage (EDS) and Lunar Lander and the Ares I lofting the Orion Crew Capsule.
The two vehicles are nominally launched 90 minutes apart from Launch Complex-39 pads A and B at Kennedy
Space Center (KSC). The architecture permits launching the vehicles in either order, and both the EDS/Lunar
Lander payload compliment and Orion have. the capability to loiter for a few days in Low Earth Orbit prior to
rendezvous and Trans-Lunar Injection. Viability of the two-launch architecture is highly dependent on the reliability
and maintainability of ground systems and the flight vehicles, particularly after the first vehicle has launched. Due to
limitations in how long the first vehicle can loiter in orbit and successfully achieve the mission, the second vehicle
must deliver a very high probability of successfully launching in sufficient time to avoid wasting the first-launched
on-orbit spacecraft. Accordingly, the Constellation Program developed a probability of launch family of
requirements that bounded the acceptable risk of mission failure due to a second vehicle launch failure at less than
one percent. This requirement stated, "The Constellation Architecture shall have a probability of crewed lunar
mission launch of not less than 99 percent during the period beginning with the launch of the first vehicle and
ending at the expiration of the last launch opportunity to achieve the targeted Trans-Lunar Injection window."' This
overarching requirement was decomposed into two child requirements that flowed to the Constellation Systems,
including the launch vehicle, the spacecraft, and ground systems.
1)The first child requirement stated that the launch vehicle, spacecraft, or ground systems shall have a
probability of launch of not less than some percentage between 99 percent and 94 percent beginning
with the decision to load cryogenic propellants and ending with the close of the day-of-launch window
for the initial planned attempt. This critical time-period was originally estimated at about fourteen hours
then later revised to ten hours.**
2) The second child requirement stated that in the event of a failure, the launch vehicle, spacecraft, or
ground systems must deliver a probability of repair of some percentage between 30 percent and 45
percent in order to be prepared to support at least one additional launch attempt within an acceptable
time period (approximately three days).
At first consideration, the child requirements would seem inconsistent with the parent requirement for the
architecture to deliver not less than a 99 percent chance of success. For example, if the vehicle and the spacecraft
each delivered a 98 percent probability of success and ground systems delivered a 99 percent probability of success,
the architecture would deliver only a 95 percent probability of success. This is true only for the first launch attempt.
The second child requirement, which defines the maintainability standards, enables a likelihood of a second launch
attempt in the event of a launch failure. The combined likelihood of a successful repair and at least one additional
launch attempt enables the architecture to satisfy the overarching requirement to deliver a probability of successful
launch within the acceptable time-period of not less than 99 percent. The requirement hierarchy is illustrated in
Figure 1.
This paper describes how the Constellation Ground Operations Project (GOP) applied quantitative Reliability,
Maintainability, and Availability (RMA) theory, tools and techniques to allocate launch probability requirements
and to assess compliance with those launch probability requirements for the Constellation Ground -System.
Additionally, the paper describes how the launch probability assessment was leveraged and translated into assessing
maintainability of the Ground System, evaluating compliance with the second child (maintainability) requirement,
and focusing efforts on logistics support and operations planning.
It should be noted that, due to the sensitivity of the detailed analysis products, specific subsystem analysis
results, subsystem names, and specific descriptive information have been generalized. However, specific analysis
results are provided to demonstrate the analysis process and the benefits of the effort. This report was developed
prior to the Ground Systems Preliminary Design Review (PDR) milestone.
.* Although there were two iterations of critical time period duration and changes to subsystems included in the
analysis, for consistency, the final critical time period value of 10 hours and the final configuration of subsystems
are used throughout this paper.
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Figure 1. Constellation 2-Launch Lunar Architecture and the Associated Launch Probability Requirements
Flow to Ground Subsystems
II. Phase I - Ground Systems Requirements and the Initial Allocation Process
Constellation Ground Systems was allocated a reliability requirement for a 99 percent probability of launch. In
other words, Constellation requirements dictated that no more than one in 100 launch attempts could be scrubbed
due to a failure of the Ground Systems after the point loading of cryogenic propellants is initiated. Historically,
throughout the Space Shuttle Program, tanking for launch was initiated approximately 205 times and there have
been approximately 24 instances where the planned launch time was delayed due to ground systems faults.'`
Therefore, historically, Ground Systems delivered an approximately 88 percent probability of successful launch
support. The Constellation architecture would therefore require significant improvements in the reliability of its
ground systems versus the Space Shuttle ground systems. In response, the Constellation GOP developed an
approach to decompose and allocate reliability requirements to the subsystem level of the Ground System, aligning
the launch availability analysis with the design team structure and design review process.
The initial analysis consisted of determining which ground subsystems would be included in the analysis. The
determination was based on the sole criterion that a failure in the subsystem could result in a launch hold or scrubs
during the critical time-period between cryogenic propellant loading and launch. Since a failure within each
subsystem could cause a hold or launch scrub, all subsystems within the probability of launch analysis were
considered in series. The reliability of a number (n) of components in series at a given time is the product of the
reliability of those components, as shown in Equation (1).
RS=Ri*R2...*R„
	 (1)
In order to assess where the general quantitative requirement values should be, the RMA team applied Equation
(1) to determine the required reliability for n=55 identical subsystems in series to deliver a 99% probability of
launch. Equation (2) shows the calculation and the results.
R, 	 ,7 R = V0.99 = .999817
	
(2)
As a result of this simple analysis, several factors became apparent, including:
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1) Given the limited knowledge of actual subsystem performance or design at the time, reliability
requirements should be allocated as "order of magnitude" requirements (such as 0.999, 0.9999,
0.99999, etc), at least initially.
2) If a total of approximately 55 ground subsystems would be required to operate successfully through the
critical time period, the vast majority of these subsystems would need to deliver at least 0.9999
availability through the critical time period.
3) Since the overall result was multiplicative, no subsystem could deliver 0.99 availability or less and
successfully meet the overall ground systems 99% probability of launch requirement. Only a very small
number of systems delivering 0.999 availability could be tolerated.
Based on the observations above, subsystems that met the launch hold or scrub criteria were subjected to further
analysis to determine the following:
1) If the subsystem was repairable within the operational constraints of the launch timeframe. For example,
once propellant loading begins, access to the launch pad area becomes extremely limited. If a repair is
required within the clear area, the launch is generally scrubbed, propellants are drained from the vehicle,
and access is restored after confirming a safe work environment. Subsystems within this launch clear
area would be analyzed for subsystem reliability during the critical period since repairs could not
contribute to subsystem availability. Subsystems with components that resided outside the launch clear
area were allowed credit for repairs during the countdown in the event of a failure if the repair could
reasonably support the countdown time limitations.
2) If the subsystem was inherently high or low availability. High availability subsystems would be required
to deliver not less than a 99.99 percent probability of successful operation through the critical time-
period. Low availability subsystems would be required to deliver not less than a 99.90 percent
probability of successful operation through the critical time-period. Factors indicating that a subsystem
should be designated as a high availability subsystem included subsystem criticality, redundancy,
reparability, and/or highly reliable performance demonstrated by a legacy subsystem. Factors indicating
a low availability designation were non-repairable subsystems, low historical performance, low
redundancy, and/or design risk. Subsequently, a third category (very high) was added for subsystems
that, due to their construction, were so monumental that a failure was extremely unlikely. These
subsystems were assigned a requirement of 99.999 percent probability of successful operation through
the critical time-period.3
The RMA team developed an initial matrix that summarized all of the ground subsystems, the KSC organization
responsible for the design, whether the system was included or excluded from the analysis and why, whether the
system was repairable, and an initial high, low, or very high availability allocation for "included" subsystems. This
matrix was continuously refined with input and support from various subject matter experts from the Space Shuttle
Launch Team, Ground Systems design teams, and Safety and Mission Assurance staffs. Support from each of these
organizations was superb with each stakeholder organization contributing significantly to the quality and clarity of
the final allocation. In this process, adjustments were made, assumptions were challenged, and the refined
requirements were formally allocated into subsystem design requirements.
Of the 80 subsystems that made up Constellation Ground Systems4:
• 25 subsystems were excluded as they were evaluated as having no impact on launch availability within the
critical time period
• 2 subsystems were evaluated as low availability
• 48 subsystems were evaluated as high availability
• 5 subsystems were evaluated as very high availability due to the extremely low probability of structural
failure within the critical time frame
Overall, 55 subsystems were identified for subsequent launch availability analysis. A simple reliability
calculation was used to assess Ground Systems' overall launch availability if each of the 55 subsystems met their
allocated launch availability requirement through the 10 hour critical time-period. This provided an initial
assessment that the allocated subsystem requirements' ability to satisfy the overarching Ground Systems
requirement of 99%. The calculation and the results are provided in Equation (3). The conclusion is that if each
subsystem meets or exceeds its allocated availability target, overall Ground Systems will meet or exceed the second
launch availability requirement.
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R(10)= (0.999) 2 * (0.9999) 48 * (0.99999)5
R(10)=.993172	 (3)
The allocation method and results described above were highly favorable for the following reasons:
1) The order of magnitude differences between the low, high, and very high allocations was appropriate,
since predicting the availability of complex subsystems is not a precise process.
2) Refining the allocations beyond the order of magnitude measures adds little value to the design engineer.
3) The excess 0.003172 provides management reserve or growth margin to address unexpected
developments that may occur during the ground system development process. Within the management
reserve an additional three "low availability" subsystems and one "high availability" subsystems could
be added (or two "low availability" and 11 "high availability" subsystems could be added, etc) and still
meet the overall Ground Systems 99% launch availability requirements. This also provided the ability to
accommodate some limited cases where subsystems that could not meet the allocated launch probability
requirements.
Phase I was completed when allocated launch availability requirements were approved by GOP decision makers.
The initial allocations were revised over time to add and remove subsystems, as required, as the Project and the
associated designs matured.
III. Phase II — Subsystem Analysis
When approved probability of launch requirements were formally allocated to the subsystem level, the analysis
effort began to assess each of the subsystems' compliance with the requirements. Requirements verification
language specified the use of quantitative analysis techniques to assess and validate compliance with the overarching
probability of launch requirements. In constructing the analysis methodology, the GOP RMA team envisioned the
following key outputs of the analysis and the associated products:
1) A quantitative estimate of subsystem reliability (or availability.for systems that could be repaired within
the critical time-period) for the critical time-period using a 95 percent confidence interval.
2) Clear documentation of the analysis assumptions. For example, if the subsystem analysis assumed that a
launch countdown would continue if one of two redundant paths failed, the assumption would need to be
further validated within the Launch Commit Criteria process.
3) An assessment of potential improvements in subsystem predicted performance early in the design in the
process, when adjustments are easier to make and are less costly.
4) An initial look into potential logistics support priorities, understanding that a more detailed
maintainability analysis would follow in the Phase III analysis.
These key outputs were envisioned to support informed decision making as new design subsystems were
developed. Additionally, several legacy subsystems were allocated launch probability requirements, as they would
be required to support Constellation launch operations. Therefore, Phase II launch probability analysis would inform
decisions regarding design alterations to both new and legacy subsystems. In addition to design changes, other
'methods to improve launch probability would be considered, such as adjustments to operational limits, procedural
concepts, or adjustments to the launch availability requirement for the subsystem within the available trade space.
The GOP RMA team evaluated a number of tools and techniques to meet the analysis requirements. Discrete
Event Simulation (DES), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), and classic reliability and maintainability techniques
were among the techniques considered. In order to produce the key outputs described above, the clear choice in
developing the RMA team's approach was to apply classic reliability and maintainability techniques.
Recognizing that KSC's ground systems were both highly complex and most had built in redundancy or stand-by
features, the more simplistic parts counts methodologies would not produce accurate reliability estimates. Parts
count methodologies essentially assume that all parts exist in series and that any failure will cause system failure.
Therefore, the Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) analysis method was selected since it appropriately addressed
subsystem functionality, operability, maintainability, and redundancy.
A. Analysis Tool Background
KSC's Integrated Design and Assurance System (IDAS) project provided an excellent source of information,
support, and tool suites to address a wide variety of reliability and assurance activities. The IDAS web site explains
that, "IDAS shares and supports tools that perform technical analysis for the design, system, safety, mission
assurance and sustaining engineering functions over the life cycle of a system. In addition, IDAS collects and shares
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information that helps the engineer or analyst to learn and apply the tools and techniques. i5 IDAS also provided
access to a variety of reliability software suites. One RMA-focused software package delivered a broad spectrum of
design, development, and life-cycle RMA analysis tools. This software was readily available to KSC users through
the Center network, along with user support, training, and technical resources through the Center's support contract
with the vendor.
The Constellation GOP RMA team primarily uses a commercially available reliability software suite in support
of the probability of launch availability and maintainability analyses. The suite is provided through KSC's IDAS
project. In this effort, the most commonly used reliability software modules are the Reliability Prediction and RBD
modules. The GOP RMA team also uses the Weibull capabilities to develop failure rates using historical data from
various failure reporting and corrective action systems. In order to understand the analysis process and the
underlying methodology, a brief primer will be useful to set the stage for the subsequent discussion.
RBD techniques form the foundation of the GOP launch availability and maintainability analysis. An RBD is a
symbolic logic model that depicts system functionality and operates in the success domain. Each RBD has a specific
start and a specific end. Each block within the RBD may represent an individual component, such as a resistor or
screw, or blocks may represent components and/or assemblies at a higher level, such as an entire automobile engine
or a complete pump, if sufficient reliability (and repair) data are available. Each RBD block captures the failure and
repair parameters of each element within the system.
RBD blocks are connected functionally to replicate the system's operational characteristics. Blocks are
connected in series if each element is required for the system to operate. Parallel branches are used when only a
subset of the depicted branches is required. This would be used when only one of two (or two of three, etc.) parallel
branches are required to successfully operate the system.
The examples below depict several representations of simple RBD configurations and their associated reliability
calculation formulae are provided in Equations (4) and (5).
Series
--► R, R2
Rs =R 1 *R2 (4)
Parallel
R,
R2
RS =1—(1—R1)*(1—R2)
	
(5)
The concepts and mathematical relationships from the basic building blocks above are applied to calculating the
reliability of more complex systems. In application, variations and combinations of these of these basic patterns are
used to depict the components of a system, the interconnections, and how they interact as the system operates as
shown in Equations (6) and (7) below.
Series-Parallel
R,	 R3
R2
	 4
RS =(1—(1—R,)*(1—R2))*(1—(1—R3)*(1—R4))
	
(6)
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Parallel-Series
	
R,	 R2
	
:R,	 R4
	
RS =1-(1-R,
	 *R2)*(1-R3*R4)	 (7)
The second key reliability software module used in the GOP launch availability effort is the Reliability
Prediction module. This portion of the software shares data with many other packaged modules, including the RBD
module. The Reliability Prediction module was used to capture and store failure and repair data for parts,
components, and assemblies used in an associated RBD.
The software tool Reliability Prediction module can be used to develop parts listings from user input data or
from parts libraries such as MIL-HDBK -217 for electronic parts, Reliability Analysis Center's handbook NPRD-95
for non-electronic parts, and NSWC-98 "Handbook of Reliability Prediction Procedures for Mechanical
Equipment". These capabilities allow the user to develop a complete parts library for the specific system based on a
variety of different sources and techniques. The Reliability Prediction module also supports multiple failure and
repair distributions.
Since the Reliability Prediction module shares data with the RBD module (and others), components in the parts
library can be pulled into the RBD as it is developed. This feature improves the ease of RBD construction and the
accuracy of the RBD data. A single part in the library may be used multiple times in the system being modeled, but
if the failure rate needs to be updated based on new data, this only needs to be done in the Reliability Prediction
module, with the RBD being updated automatically upon calculation of the reliability of the system.
B. Analysis Methodology
The GOP RMA team initially encountered a significant amount of skepticism early in the project. Throughout
the initial allocation process, a number of concerns were voiced by the various stakeholders. The most frequent
concerns were:
1) "Meeting these requirements will drive cost through the roof."
2) "The design teams are already overtaxed. This RMA work will create huge burdens on the design teams
and detract from the real work within the design effort."
3) "There's no way we will ever meet this requirement for 99.99% reliability at the subsystem level."
4) "We think you did the math wrong on the allocation process."
Through several weeks of discussion, stakeholders developed a better understanding of the analysis objectives
and the RMA team developed a better appreciation for their concerns. Accordingly, a methodology was developed
that was focused on achieving the following objectives:
1) Introduce the RMA team as an embedded member of each design team and as a resource to the design
team.
2) Minimize the time impact on design team by developing understanding of the design package within the
RMA team from available engineering resources and use the design team only for clarification or
confirmation that the model and underlying assumptions were correct.
3) Link the RMA analysis to the design review milestones, wherever possible and include the Launch
Availability Analysis report as a reviewable document within the design package.
4) Provide feedback to the design team, such as reliability improvement recommendations, throughout the
design process and deliver no surprises to the design team in the final analysis. This included supporting
the design effort by evaluating alternative solutions from a system reliability perspective.
In execution, these objectives were largely achieved by following a similar process through each subsystem
analysis. First, an analysis schedule was developed based on the subsystem design review schedule. Launch
availability analyses supported the 60%, 90%, and 100% design reviews for each subsystem with an allocated
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probability of launch requirement!t Each analysis was documented in a peer-reviewed report. The analysis followed
the following general process:
1) The design package was made available to the RMA team electronically.
2) The RMA team reviewed the design package to become oriented with the subsystem functionality,
operations concepts, and the specific design. The following documents and data sources within the
design review package were assessed within the launch availability analysis:
a. Operational Concept Documents
b. System Assurance Analysis (SAA) — which included fault tree and hazard analyses
c. Drawings and Schematics
d. Parts information and listings
e. Logistics Support Analysis (LSA)
f. Interface diagrams and tables
g. Launch Commit Criteria documentation
h. Subsystem training plans
i. Lessons learned reports
j. Procurement specifications
k. Subsystem Requirements Documents
3) Based on the integrated understanding of subsystem functionality, operating profile, and risks developed
during the design package review, the RMA team decomposed the subsystem to an appropriate level,
developed functional flow diagrams, and produced initial parts listings specific to the design. The flow
diagrams reflected the operational usage, system layout, connectivity, and redundancy schemes, and
formed the basis for subsequent RBD development. Frequently, several functional flow diagrams would
be required to capture the necessary scope of the subsystem.
4) Having developed an initial understanding of the subsystem operation and functionality, the RMA team
would conduct an initial meeting with the design team to confirm that there was a correct understanding
of subsystem operations, confirm or revise functional flow diagrams, resolve questions, review the parts
listing, if required, and determine if any subsequent design changes were in work for the design release.
These initial meetings normally lasted one to two hours. The knowledge of the design team was
instrumental in accurately capturing how the subsystem operates, which components need to be
included in the reliability analysis, the associated failure data, and how to best map the subsystem
configuration in the RBD.
5) Building on the knowledge developed and a common understanding (with the design team) of the
subsystem operation, layout, components and assumptions, the RMA team refined the parts list and the
associated failure and repair data for each modeled component or assembly. This information was
catalogued in the associated software Reliability Prediction module for the subsystem. Failure and
repair data was compiled using the following information sources to determine the most accurate and
most applicable data:
a. Manufacturer's data for the specific part
b. Failure data develop from like-comparison failure histories
c. Parts libraries
d. Other reference materials such as IEEE Std 493-2007, IEEE Recommended Practice for the
Design of Reliable Industrial and Commercial Power Systems
e. Test data
f. Reliability prediction techniques
6) RBDs modeling the subsystem were then developed using the information from the functional flow
block diagrams and the reliability and repair data contained for each component or assembly in the
associated parts library in the Prediction module. All components analyzed within the RBD were
considered to be operating at optimum level and conditions until a failure occurred. The configuration
of the component within the RBD identified if the system success was dependent on one or more
component failures. The blocks of the RBD may represent individual components or component
substructures, which in turn may be represented by other RBDs. The complexity of the RBDs is
tt Not all subsystems followed the 30%, 60%, 90% 100% design review process. A few subsystems deviated with
other design review milestones such as 45% and 90%. The Legacy subsystems usually did not have design review
milestones associated with them.
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dependent upon various factors such as mission profiles, function criticality, and redundancy
characteristics.
7) Initial estimates were developed using the RBD module Monte Carlo simulator for the 10 hour critical
time-period and a 95% confidence interval. Normally, one million Monte Carlo simulations were
executed. The results were examined and peer reviewed by the RMA team to verify that all connections
were correctly made, the correct parts were in the correct locations, the parts data were correctly
entered, and that the RBD functioned as depicted in the functional flow diagram.
8) Initial observations were developed and shared with the design team during a second feedback session.
RMA team observations shared with the design team frequently included:
a. Reliability improvement recommendations
b. Drawing corrections
c. High failure rate nodes within the design
d. Design inconsistencies
e. GIDEP alerts on parts specified for use
f. Obsolete parts specified for use
9) The analysis report was then developed in support of the design review schedule. A documentation
scheme was developed that captured the RMA requirements compliance verification process b and
verification of probabilistic requirements using a six step process.'
10) After peer review and further coordination with the design team, the report was loaded into the design
review package as a reviewable and commentable document.
C. Launch Availability Analysis Observations
As the GOP approached the PDR milestone, 25 subsystems of the 55 subsystems with allocated probability of
launch requirements had been analyzed at least once. Most of the analyzed subsystems were new design subsystems
and a few were legacy subsystems. Analysis priority was given to the new design subsystems and supporting their
multiple design reviews over the legacy subsystems.
Across the 25 analyzed systems, the following facts emerged leading into the PDR:
1) 16 of the 25 subsystems met or exceeded allocated their launch availability requirements
2) 9 of the 25 subsystems fell slightly short of meeting their launch availability requirements, consuming
some of the management reserve
3) Overall, the evaluated subsystems delivered 0.9945 probability of launch.
4) If the remaining 30 subsystems met or exceeded their allocated requirements, ground systems would
deliver an overall launch availability of 99.2%, exceeding the overarching requirement.
5) If the remaining 30 subsystems perform similarly to the first 25 subsystem, in terms of predicted
performance compared to allocated requirements, ground systems would deliver an overall launch
availability of 99.08%, exceeding the overarching requirement.
Although the launch availability assessment as of PDR indicated that Constellation Ground Systems was on track to
meet or exceed the 99% probability of launch requirement (with 95% confidence), additional analysis of the
reliability growth through the process provided more insight into the impact of the RMA process on the subsystem
designs. Of the 25 analyzed subsystems, nine were reviewed more than once. The reliability growth calculated for
each of these nine subsystems as they progressed through multiple reviews is summarized in Table 1. The results
indicate the following about subsystem reliability improvement using the methodology stated in this paper:
1) On average, the RMA and design teams improved the reliability of subsystems by a factor of 9.3. This
result is the ratio of the average improved design MTTF over the average original design MTTF.
2) The reliability improvement results in Table 1 are understated for two reasons:
a. Many design improvements were often incorporated into the initial design packages as a result
of the initial launch availability analysis.
b. The 10 hour subsystem availability value was "capped" at no better than 0.999999. Several
subsystems had better estimated performance.
3) The first subsystem in Table 1 is indicative of improvements achieved in a subsystem without reliability
improvement included into the initial design package. Due to the timing of this design package, little or
no RMA team input to design reliability was incorporated into the initial design package. In this case,
the reliability improvement factor was estimated at about 250.
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Reliability MTTF (hrs) Reliabilty
Subsystem Initial Improvements Initial Improvements Improvement
Reliability Implemented (ham)
rs)
Implemented Factor
1 1	 0.999750 0.999999 39,995 9,999,995 250.0
2 0.999930 0.999999 142,852 9,999,995 70.0
4 0.999940 0.999999 166,662 9,999,995 60.0
5 0.999885 0.999970 86,952 333,328 3.8
6 0.999997 0.999999 3,333,328 9,999,995 3.0
7 0.999915 0.999965 117,642 285,709 2.4
8 0.998363 0.999207 6,104 12,605 2.1
9 0.999981 0.999983 526,311 588,230 1.1
0.997762 0.999121 552,481 5,152,482 49.1
Composite Reliability Average
(RI*R2*R3	 *R9) Average MTTF Improvement
Factor
Table 1. Reliability Improvement of Subsystems with Multiple Reviews
4) The average of the nine reliability improvement factors indicates an average improvement factor of 49
across the nine subsystems with multiple reviews.
In each of the nine cases, subsystem availability improved as a direct result of the implemented approach and
methodology. In the analysis of each of the first 25 Ground Operations subsystems, performance improvements
were made by identifying the follow types of problems:
1) Adding redundancy to key failure nodes
2) Clearly identifying and challenging which functional elements of the subsystem were actually required to
support launch countdown
3) Clarifying or establishing operational criteria, such as, two of three "strings" within the subsystem must
be operable to continue the countdown
4) Replacing obsolete parts or components within the design with current or improved parts
5) Identifying manufacturer parts with better performance for key failure nodes
6) Identifying linked nodes of failure that will reduce the effectiveness of existing subsystem redundancy
7) Identifying inconsistencies across multiple subsystems.
Additionally, reliability improvements that were identified within one subsystem were carried across multiple
subsystems designs. For example, the RMA team discovered that the greatest contribution to the unreliability of one
subsystem was from the power scheme. This power scheme was to be used as the power scheme for most of the
other 55 subsystems evaluated for launch availability. By working with the power scheme and subsystem designers,
the RMA team evaluated and recommended potential improvements based on quantitative reliability results. The
best power scheme configuration was propagated to most of the remaining subsystems through the overarching
modification of all power schemes, improving many subsystems and overall Ground Systems launch availability.
IV. The Maintainability Requirement
As the launch availability methodology was refined, the GOP RMA team developed a second methodology to
assess subsystem maintainability and compliance with the requirement that in the event of a failure, ground systems
must be able to repair 30 percent of the failures and support readiness for launch within an acceptable time-period
(69 hours). This requirement was flowed directly to each ground subsystem with an allocated launch availability
requirement.
The methodology to assess subsystem maintainability leveraged the subsystem RBD already developed under
the launch availability analysis. If the RBD could be used to show the relative likelihood of the various failure paths,
then repair scenarios could be evaluated for the most likely failures. Fault Tree Analysis uses a similar technique
called cut set analysis. A cut set is a unique combination of component failures that can cause an overall system
failure. The RMA team found the best explanation of cut sets to be "unique combinations of component failures that
can cause system failure. i" The article further defined a minimal cut set as "when any basic event (failure of a
component) is removed from the set, the remaining events collectively are no longer a cut set." 9 Minimal cut sets
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can be used to understand the likelihood of a subsystem failure. Essentially, minimal cut sets define all of the
combinations of failures that must occur for the system to fail. Minimal cut sets may consist of one of more
components. For complex or redundant systems, minimal cut sets can (and do) number in the millions. By defining
each component'within a cut set, the analyst can calculate the likelihood of all events occurring within a stated time
period. This would result in subsystem unavailability.
As an example, consider a system that can fail in 1,000 different ways. Each failure path may contain any
number of components, from one to many. Each of those failure paths are defined by the components that contribute
to the failure path and by . the failure data for each of the contributing components. Unavailability can then be
calculated for each failure path within the given time period. The cut set results can be numerically ordered, for
example, from the highest unavailability to the least for each of the 1,000 failure paths. This shows the analyst the
quantitative estimate for each failure path and the relative likelihood within the system of the failure occurring.
The reliability software package used by the RMA team delivers the ability to produce cut set analysis from
within the RBD module. Therefore, cut sets derived from an RBD can be used to determine each failure path that
cause the system to fail and the combined unreliability of those components within each cut set. Since this is a
calculated value based on the failure data for each component (retained in the RBD and the associated parts library),
the unreliability of each failure path can be calculated as a point estimate and the composite cut set listing can be
rank ordered from most likely to least likely to occur. Additionally, since the unreliability associated with each cut
set is a calculated value they can be readily compared within the subsystem, and since each subsystem could
individually create a hold or scrub if it failed, cut sets can be compared and ranked across ground subsystems.
A. Cut Sets - Easier Said Than Done
The complexity of KSC's ground systems required developing very sophisticated RBDs. Some complex
subsystems were modeled with over 3,000 blocks. In order to organize such systems, the software package RBD
module provides the capability to create "linked diagrams" within an RBD. This allows a top level outline level
RBD to be decomposed into one or many linked diagrams where lower levels of detail are developed and displayed.
This technique does not create problems with the RBD module reliability or availability calculations. However, it
does create problems in developing integrated cut set results within complex systems that use linked diagrams.
The GOP RMA team observed that the software would not calculate cut set results for linked diagrams.
However, cut sets could readily be developed for lower level diagrams as long as a linked diagram was not included.
The RMA team brought this issue to the vendor to resolve. As of the date of this report, resolution of the cut set
compilation problem was ongoing by the vendor. In the meantime, a more labor intensive work-around was
successfully developed to gather, compile and rank cut set output using a spreadsheet in order to complete the
maintainability analysis process.
B. Cut Set Analysis Results
Leading up to the PDR milestone, the RMA team had successfully evaluated cut set results for 16 subsystems.
Several subsystems produced millions of cut sets. Due to the complexity of managing millions of cut sets and the
extremely low probability of many of the possible failure paths, cut sets with unavailability less than 1x10 -16 (point
estimate) were not included in the analysis. Table 2 shows the cut set results for these 16 subsystems.
The results show that for many of these systems, most of the failures come from a very limited number of failure
paths. On average, about one-tenth of one percent of a bounded set of all possible failure paths (only those cut sets
with greater than 1x10 -16 unavailability) caused about 30 percent of the subsystem unavailability. Less than one
percent of these paths caused about 90 percent of the failures.
Although the RMA team expected that most subsystem failures would come from a limited number of sources,
these results were surprising. The implications of this analysis for reliability improvement and validation of the
maintainability requirement were also highly significant. When a small number of failure paths make such large
contributions to subsystem unavailability isolating the key failure paths becomes obvious. Even in a complex system
with thousands of components, the cut set analysis clearly shows the most likely paths. This enables the design team
to focus on either:
1) Improving the design to correct the high failure nodes (improving reliability), or
2) On ensuring that the component is as repairable as possible (improving maintainability) by ensuring that
access is to the component(s) is readily available, appropriate spares are established, and repair
procedures are developed and tested.
Cut set analysis provides clear indication of where the most likely failure paths would be depending on the
accuracy of the RBD that depicts the subsystem arrangement and the accuracy of the failure data contained within
the parts library.
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Subsystem
Subsystem
Reliability
Number of
Cut Sets
(Unavailability
> 1E-16)
Number of Cut
Sets (301/o of
Subsystem
Unavailability)
Percentage of
Cut Sets (30%
of Subsystem
Unavailability)
Number of Cut
Sets (901/6 of
Subsystem
Unavailability)
Percentage of
Cut Sets (90%
of Subsystem
Unavailability)
a 1	 0.999999 1,751 9 0.51% 211 12.05%
b 0.999239 29 1 3.45% 12 41.38%
c 0.999319 32 l 3.13% 13 40.63%
d 0.999671 39 2 5.13% 20 51.28%
e 0.999721 13 1 7.69% 7 53.85%
f 0.999974 692 1 0.14% 3 0.43%
g 0.999983 270 1 0.37% 4 1.48%
h 0.999999 393,480 390 0.10% 1,150 0.29%
i 0.999938 5,729 9 0.16% 36 0.63%
j 0.999997 263 1 0.38% 11 4.18%
k 0.999885 28,653 12 0.04% 121 0.42%
1 0.999825 15 1 6.67% 3 20%
m 0.999488 2,908 1 0.03% 292 10%
n 0.999358 968 30 3.10% 40 411/o
0 0.999999 20 1 5.00% 3 15%
434,862 461 0.11% 1,926 0.44%
Total Total Average Total Total Average
Table 2. Cut Set Analysis Results for Sixteen Subsystems
V. Conclusion
The work accomplished by the Constellation Ground Operations RMA team in conjunction with the many
contributing design teams was instrumental in developing and assessing quantitative requirements for both
probability of launch availability and subsystem maintainability. The analysis methodology produced results that
were highly repeatable and auditable. The process made significant and measurable contributions to ground systems
reliability. As of the Constellation Ground Operations Preliminary Design Review milestone, the GOP was on track
to exceed the requirements for Ground Systems to deliver a 99 percent probability of launch for the second launched
vehicle in the Constellation architecture. Had this type of analysis been conducted in support of the Space Shuttle
Program, Space Shuttle ground systems performance could have improved from the historical 88 percent to at least
98.6 percent launch reliability. In planning to recover from a launch scrub, the maintainability analysis using cut set
techniques clearly identified the most critical failure nodes and where resources could be best applied to evaluate
subsystem improvement (to prevent the problem) or to improve the subsystem maintainability (to successfully
recover). This analysis is highly adaptable and usable across a wide variety of RMA applications.
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Appendix A
Acronym List
DES Discrete Event Simulation
IDAS Integrated Design and Assurance System
GIDEP Government-Industry Data Exchange Program
GOP Ground Operations Project
GS-SRD Ground Systems - Systems Requirements Document
MTBF Mean Time Between Failure
MTTF Mean Time to Failure
PDR Preliminary Design Review
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
RBD Reliability Block Diagram
RMA Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability
Appendix B
Glossary
Availability	 The probability that a component or system will perform its intended function
with no failures for a given period of time when used under specified operating
conditions.
Maintainability	 The probability a failed item will be restored or repaired to a specified
condition within a given period.
Reliability	 The probability that a repairable system will perform its intended function at a
given point in time or over a specified period of time when operated and
maintained in a prescribed manner. Thus, availability is a function of reliability
and maintainability.
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Constellation Dual Launch Architecture 
Architecture Level Availability Requirement (-3 days) 
Launch of 151 Vehicle Loiter of Earth Departure 
• Stage & Lunar Lander 
• _.-_.---------_.--_.-_.----_.--------------------------1 
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Probability Launch Requirement Flowdown 
Ares V - Ares I Launch Order Example 
Overarching Requirement (69 hours) 
The Constellation Architecture shall have a probability of crewed lunar mission 
launch of not less than 99% during the period beginning with the launch of the first 
vehicle and ending at the expiration of the last launch opportunity to ach ieve the 
targeted TLI window. 
, 
I Orion Spacecraft I I Ares I Launch Vehicle I Ground Systems I 
~~ /~ /~ 
Probability of Launch Maintainability Probabil ity of Launch Mainta inability Probabi lity of Launch Maintainabi lity 
(10 hours) 97% (69 hours) 30% (10 hours) 97% (69 hours) 30% (10 hours) 99% (69 hours) 30% 
I 
Probability of day one launch after first vehicle launch is -96.75% 
(-90 minutes) \ 'oj J Also Includes Range, Weather, Mission Systems, & EVA systems 
Gr~ SUbSystems Ground SUbSY~? 
Second launch opportunity via maintainability Proba . ity of Launch Maintainabi li 
requirement achieves 99% for architecture 
"'- ./ 
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Determining the Requirements Allocation Level 
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IIV Leve 
Eleme nts 
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Element & Communications Integration Element Element 
--------- ,------------ -r----------------------------
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Allocation Results and Trade Space 
• Of the 80 Ground Operations subsystems: 
• 25 Subsystems were excluded as they were evaluated as having no 
impact on launch availability within the critical time period . 
• 55 Ground Subsystems were allocated launch availability requirements 
> 2 subsystems were allocated as low availability (0.999) 
> 48 subsystems were allocated as high availability (0.9999) 
> 5 subsystems were allocated as very high availability due to the extremely 
low probability of structura l failure within the critical time frame (0.99999) 
R(l 0) = (0.999)2 * (0.9999t 8 * (0.99999)5 
R( 10) = . 9~31 721+ -j Management Reserve I 
Management Reserve Supports 3 Additional "Low" Availability Subsystems 
and 1 Additional "High" Availability Subsystem 
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Tools and Techniques 
Analysis Methodology 
Results as of GOP PRO 
Reliability Growth 
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Tools and Techniques 
Reliability Block Diagram 
• A symbolic logic model that depicts and analyzes the reliability (and/or 
availability) relationships between the system and system elements and/or events 
• A system element can be a subsystem, subassembly, component, or part 
• Typical RBD models are constructed of series-, parallel-, k-out-of-n-redundant-, 
combinations of series and parallel-, and active and stand-by configurations 
• Captures the various component/assembly failure and repair parameters 
• Describes a successful operation (i.e. , performs its intended function) when an 
uninterrupted path exists between the model's input and output 
• Predicts the overall reliability/availability of the system at a given time or through 
a specified period of time 
Start 
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Spacecraft Example 
[ 10 f2 p ara llel 1_.~ I>-i> ~...,.....-=~ L Switch Prob : 1 j- ~ 
l'==='==-==.J Guidance and Control 
Failure: Nannal 
Mean : 30000 
StdDev: 1000 
Data Monitoring subsystem 
Power generation 
MTBF: 50000 
MTBF: 1000000 
Data transmission 
Failure: Weibull 
Char. Life: 500000 
Shape Fact. : 1.2 
to : 0 
End 
1 :: 1 
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Subsystem Availability Analysis Methodology 
• Initiate subsystem analysis to support design review milestone 
• Gain electronic access to the design package 
• Drawings 
• Operational Concept Documents 
• System Assurance Analysis (SAA) - Contains Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and Hazards Analysis 
• Parts information 
• Review design package 
• Develop integrated understanding of subsystem functionality , operating profile, risks 
• Decompose subsystem to appropriate level 
• Develop functional diagrams 
• Meet with design team to: 
• Confirm understanding of subsystem operations 
• Resolve questions 
• Confirm/revise functional diagrams 
• Develop 
• Parts listing with associated reliability and repair data 
• Reliability Block Diagrams 
• Initial analysis package 
• Meet with design team to confirm/revise analysis product 
• Submit final product for community review as part of design package 
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Results Leading into GOP PDR 
• Of the 
Availa 
• 29 
• 22 
the 
• 70 
the 
55 Subsystems with Launch 
bility requirements: 
were analyzed at least once 
of the 29 subsystems met or exceeded 
ir allocated launch availabili ty requ irements 
f the 29 subsystems fell short of meeting 
ir launch availability requirements 
• Overa 
delive 
II, the evaluated subsystems 
red 0.9960 probability of launch. 
• Ne t requirement 0.9953 
• Ov erall exceeded allocated requirements 
emaining 26 subsystems met or • If the r 
exceed ed their allocated requirement: 
• GO 
ava 
the 
P would deliver an overall launch 
ilabi lity of 99.39% (or better) - exceed ing 
overarching requirement. 
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Subsys tem CUITen t Es timate Des ign (at 10 hours) Statu s Req uirelllelll 
A 0.999825 45% 0.999 
B 0.999972 60"10 
C 0.999999 90% 
D 0.999999 Post 90% 
E I 90% 
F 0.999999 100% 
G 0.999999 90% 
H 0.999952 90% 
I 0.99994 1 90% 
J 0.999938 Post 60% 
K 0.999999 90% 
L 0.999930 In it ial 0.9999 
M 0.999999 Post 60% 
N 0.9993 19 90% 
0 0.999979 60"10 
P 0.999970 Post 60% 
Q 0.9998 12 90% 
R 0.999239 90% 
S 0.999620 90% 
T 0.99967 1 90% 
u 0.999965 Post 60"10 
VI 
V2 
V3 0.99998 1 In it ia l 0.9995 
V4 
V5 
w 0.999983 90% 
X 0.999721 90% 0.9999 
Y 0.999207 Post 60% 
Results at 10 hours and 95% confidence 
..... 
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Reliability Improvement 
Eight Subsystems with Multiple Reviews 
Initial 
Re liabi li ty 
initial MTTF 
MTTF (hrs) Reliabi lty 
Subsystem Imp 1'0 v e me n ts Improvements lmprovement 
Reliability (h I's) imp lemented Imp lemen ted Facto r 
1 0.999750 0.999999 39,995 9,999,995 250.0 
2 0.999930 0.999999 142,852 9,999,995 70.0 
3 0.999940 0.999999 166,662 9,999,995 60.0 
4 0.999885 0.999970 86,952 333,328 3.8 
5 0.999997 0.999999 3,333,328 9,999,995 3.0 
6 0.999915 0.999965 11 7,642 285,709 2.4 
7 0.998363 0.999207 6, 104 12,605 2. 1 
8 0.99998 1 0.999983 526,3 1 1 588,230 1.1 
0.997762 0.999121 552,48 1 5,152,482 49. 1 
Compos ite Re liab ility Average 
Average MTTF Imp rovement (Rl *R2*R3 ... *R9) 
Facto r 
Results from this table are understated for the following reasons: 
a. Many design improvements were often incorporated into the initial deSign packages as a result of the initial launch availability analysis. 
b. The 10 hour subsystem availability value was "capped" at no better than 0.999999. Several subsystems had better estimated performance. 
Significant Reliability Improvement - Negligible Cost Growth 
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Phase III - Addressing Maintainability 
The Requirement & Challenges 
Approach via Cut Set Analysis 
Subsystem Cut Set Results (to date) 
Composite Ground Systems Cut Set Results (to date) 
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Maintainability Requirement 
• The Requirement 
• After launch of the Ares V on crewed lunar missions, Ground Systems shall 
be repaired and ready to support launch of the Ares I integrated stack 
within 69 hours for 30% of scrub occurrences caused by detectable Ground 
Systems failures 
• Challenges 
• Identify the most likely failure events (or combination of events) that would 
cause a launch hold or scrub. 
• How to quantify and rank the likelihood of failure within a subsystem for all 
possible component failure combinations that would lead to a launch scrub 
or hold 
• How to make like comparisons across multiple subsystems with differing 
top level failure rates in order to focus maintainability efforts on the most 
likely failure scenarios 
• Address design, maintenance and/or logistics solutions. 
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Maintainability Requirement Approach 
• Cut Sets - unique combinations of component failures that can cause 
system failure 
• Frequently used in Fault Tree Analysis - Can be derived from RBD 
• Simple Cut Set Example 
LD1 Two Cut Sets: 
LD3 1. LD1 and LD2 
2. LD3 
LD2 
I Top Level Diagram I 
• Linked Diagram Complexity 
• What if LD1 , LD2 and LD3 each contained four elements in series? 
-1 2-1 H 2-2 H 2-3 H 2-4 ~ 
-1 3-1 H 3-2 H 3-3 I 
16 possible 
failure 
paths 
4 additional 
failure paths 
(Linked Diagram LD-1 corresponds to elements 1-1 through 1-4) 
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20 total possible 
failure paths 
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Sample Ground Subsystem 
Simple Enough ... 
I This is a top-level roll-up diagram I 
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Subsystem Cut Set Results 
15 Ground Subsystem Results 
Current Number of Number o f Cut Percent age of Number of Cu t Percen tage 0 f 
Subs ys tem Cut Sets ets (30"10 0 f Cu t Sets (30% Sets (90% of Cut Set (90"10 
Reliability (Unavailabili ty Sub ystem of Subsystem Subsys tem of Subsystem 
Subs ys tem Estimate > IE-16) Una vailability) Unavailability) Unavailability) Unavailability) 
I 0.999999 1.75 1 9 0.51% 211 12.05% 
2 0.999239 29 I 3.45% 12 41.38% 
3 0.9993 19 32 I 3. 13% 13 40.63% 
4 0.999671 39 2 5. 13% 20 51.28% 
5 0.999721 13 I 7.69% 7 53.85% 
6 0.999999 692 I 0. 14% 3 0.43% 
7 0.999983 270 I 0.37% 4 1.48% 
8 0.999999 393.480 390 0.10% 1,150 0.29% 
9 0.999938 5,729 9 0. 16% 36 0.63% 
10 0.999999 263 I 0.38% II 4. 18% 
I I 0.999970 28,653 12 0.04% 121 0.42% 
12 0.999825 15 I 6.67% 3 20"10 
13 0.9998 12 2,908 I 0.03% 292 10% 
14 0.99998 1 968 30 3. 10"10 40 4% 
15 0.999999 20 I 5.00% 3 15% 
434.862 461 0. 11% 1.926 0.44% 
Total Total Average To tal Total Average 
• Cut set analysis clearly shows the most likely failure paths within complex subsystems . 
• This enables the design team to focus on either: 
• Improving the design to correct the high failure nodes (improving reliab ility), or 
• Ensuring that the component is as repairable as possible (improving ma intainabi lity) by ensuring that 
access to the component(s) is readily available , appropriate spares are established, and repair 
procedures are developed and tested . 
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COMPOSITE Cut Set Results to Date 
Top 20 Cut Sets - 15 Ground Subsystem Results 
~ 
Cut Set Cut Set 
Cumulative Contribution Contribution • These results are 
Cut Set Rank Ground to Ground to Cut Set PARTIAL - only 15 of 
within GOP by Systems Systems Subsystem Subsystem Unavailability 55 total subsystems 
Unavailability Unavail (%) Unavail (%) "Name" Unavail (%) at 10 Hours are included 
1 4.85% 4.85% A 31.03% 1.94E-04 • Assumes GOP 
2 9.70% 4.85% B 27.56% 1.94E-04 launch unavailability 
3 14.55% 4.85% B 27.56% 1.94E-04 =.0061 
4 16.95% 2.40% B 13.64% 9.60E-05 (i.e. =1-.9939) 
5 19.1 5% 2.20% C 14.06% 8.79E-05 • Composite cut set 
6 21.24% 2.09% 0 34.33% 8.36E-05 analysis clearly 
7 23.05% 1.81% E 49.94% 7.26E-05 shows where the 
most likely failure 
8 24.87% 1.81% E 49.94% 7.26E-05 paths within the 
9 26.67% 1.80% A 11 .54% 7.22E-05 Ground Systems 
10 27.98% 1.31% F 17.37% 5.24E-05 Architecture. 
11 29.25% 1.27% B 7.24% 5.1 0E-05 Each of these cut • 12 30.53% 1.27% F 16.90% 5.10E-05 sets are due to single 
13 31 .65% 1.13% A 7.20% 4.50E-05 component failures 
14 32.75% 1.09% 0 17.91% 4.36E-05 (as expected) 
15 33.59% 0.84% 0 13.87% 3.38E-05 
16 34.40% 0.81% A 5.18% 3.24E-05 
17 35.11 % 0.71 % A 4.55% 2.B4E-05 
18 35.82% 0.71 % A 4.55% 2.84E-05 
19 36.46% 0.64% A 4.08% 2.55E-05 
20 37.04% 0.58% B 3.31% 2.33E-05 
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Conclusions and Path Forward 
• Conclusions to Date 
• The value added of these analyses became quickly apparent to the design teams 
and to leadership 
~ Major inputs to subsystem design reliability/availability improvement, contingency planning , 
& logistics support 
~ Future input to maintenance planning 
• Initial healthy skepticism turned to strong support and formal inclusion into design 
process 
~ Cost growth concerns also reduced - so far 
• Another tool , particularly useful in the project's design phase 
• Forward Work 
• Launch Availability 
~ Complete assessment of new design and legacy subsystem launch availability 
• Maintainability 
~ Continue developing and analyzing cut sets for remaining subsystems 
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